

THE PSYCHOANALYST AS REVOLUTIONARY

ALAN MICHAEL KARBELNIG 

By comparing psychoanalytic transformational processes to political revolutions, the author advances the psychoanalytic project in several ways. The analogy extends British object relations theory by elaborating upon Fairbairn's (1952) observation that psychoanalysts arduously compete with their patients' devotions to their internal worlds. In essence, he argues, and by exploiting the 'mutual but asymmetrical' (Aron, 1991) intimacy of the psychoanalytic dyad, psychoanalysts foment change in individuals like revolutionaries alter governments. The comparison to political revolutions also highlights how changes in the behaviour of other persons in patients' lives are necessary for transformation. Clinical insurgencies, when successful, alter patients' intra-psychic structures, interpersonal relationships, and overall behavioural patterns. The paper includes two case examples, one a successful revolution and the other not, as illustrations.

KEYWORDS: FAIRBAIRN, REVOLUTION, OBJECT RELATIONS, EGO, OBJECTS, INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS, PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

A recent patient's dramatic enthusiasm at positive changes achieved through psychoanalytic psychotherapy illuminates the potential we psychoanalytic psychotherapists have for inciting revolutionary transformations in our patients. The 39-year-old female executive, Beth, elevated in professional status, grew closer to her husband, made new friends, and pursued interests in tennis and hiking. Perhaps compensating for my prideful reaction, her zeal reminded me of an earlier, dismal failure – a student named Aaron. He regressed rather than progressed. His backwards movement demonstrates not only the power of intra-psychic resistance, but also how real parties in patients' lives – family members, romantic partners, friends – resist change. In both cases, extra-analytic interpersonal relationships proved crucial in mutative processes. Whatever their preferred theories, psychoanalytic psychotherapists facilitate individual, personal transformation. They impact patients in moments of time, and across periods of time. They access and disrupt patients' internal dramas, influencing patients' thinking, feeling, and behaving, which, in turn, alters their interpersonal relationships. In like manner, revolutionaries incite changes in societies – improving citizens' well-being, enhancing justice, and enabling peace.

In fairness, revolutions often result in corrupt, even murderous regimes. Interestingly, patients' journeys to individual transformation can also be hazardous, albeit less dramatically so. Most importantly, then, how does comparing psychoanalytic processes to political revolutions further psychoanalysis?

The analogy helpfully extends British object relations theory – specifically Fairbairn's (1952) observation that psychoanalysts compete with their patients' intense attachments to their internal objects. (I prefer the phrase *internal drama*, over *endo-psychic* or *internal object world*.) The odds of success in altering the relations between characters in patients' internal dramas are low. Savvy bookmakers would bet on patients, not psychoanalysts. Fairbairn (1952) identified a scrap, a skirmish between psychoanalysts and patients, considering patients' hesitance to renounce their repressed objects explanatory of the 'extreme stubbornness of the resistance' (p. 73). We humans are strongly engaged with our internal dramas, even if they involve relations with bad, sadistic internal actors. They create a sense of comfort, of familiarity. As Meltzer (1981) noted, we tend to populate our relational world based on our internal drama; in parallel, we influence those we randomly encounter to play internally familiar roles.

Further, and in addition to disrupting patients' rigid internal dramas paralleled by similarly inflexible social spheres, many psychoanalytic psychotherapists identify acute moments of transformation suggestive of the word, *revolutionary*. Kleinian analysts recommend attending to the greatest anxiety during each psychotherapy session (Klein, 1946). Spillius (1994) believes such an emphasis helps 'analysts look for moment-to-moment shifts in a session from integration and depressive anxiety toward fragmentation and sometimes persecution, rather than looking only for major shifts in character and orientation' (p. 334). The Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG) (2010) describes psychoanalytic encounters as actions that 'cannot be routine, habitual, or technical; they must be novel and fashioned to meet the singularity of the moment' (p. 19). Ergo, the centrality of spontaneity and improvisation (Ringstrom, 2007) in working psychoanalytically. The psychoanalytic relationship might be 'mutual but asymmetrical' (Aron, 1991, p. 43), but it is, ideally, intense. The psychoanalytic partisan, one might argue, offers provocative confrontations, interpretations, clarifications of feelings or other forms of engagement intent upon altering well worn intra-psychic, interpersonal, and behavioural patterns. These interventions may spark more spontaneous periods of growth paralleling the more glacier-like movements of other psychoanalytic processes.

It is important to note, at this early juncture, psychoanalysis' emphasis on enhancing patients' freedom and autonomy. Psychoanalytic therapists share a focus on the unconscious; they strive to bring disavowed, denied, or unconscious themes to patients' consciousness. These changes empower patients; they facilitate their discovering their own, authentic desires. Corporations, governments, and other major institutions increasingly mandate empirically based and objectively measurable interventions in clinical settings. These organizations insist psychodynamic psychotherapists behave as 'subjects presumed to know' (Lacan, 1998, p. 232), delivering rapid symptom reduction to ensure a return to typical societal function.

Psychoanalytic processes run counter to these post-humanist, audit-oriented global trends. Much like how revolutions create changes needed by masses of citizens, psychoanalysts work to increase patients' capacities to access, and act upon, their desires. Their work stands in opposition to what Foucault (1995) considers sociocultural 'procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies' (p. 169). The need for psychotherapists to concentrate on their patients, and keep their agendas for change out of the consulting room, has long been emphasized by humanistic psychoanalysts like Szasz (1968, 1988), Fromm (1961, 2000), and others.

Finally, the comparison uniquely incorporates the mutative role of *real interpersonal relationships*. Pioneering psychoanalysts worked solely to transform intra-psychoic structure. If successful in their work, they integrated id into ego (Freud, 1993c), strengthened the ego (Hartmann, 1952), or reduced persecutory anxieties (Klein, 1950). Since the mid-twentieth century, psychoanalytic theorists broadened their conceptualizations. They worked to increase the cohesiveness of the self (Kohut, 1979), to establish 'new, alternative principles for organizing experience' (Stolorow & Atwood, 1996, p. 183), or to bring interpersonal 'meaning and their vicissitudes in the developing human being' (Ghent, 1989, p. 177). However, even these conceptualizations of psychoanalytic change still privileged psychoanalyst–patient forces.

After reviewing underlying assumptions, I compare individual transformations to societal revolutions utilizing the two case examples. McAllum (2018), a political scientist, claims 'the idea of revolution varies enormously in almost every case' (p. 1), unwittingly validating the unique nature of each patient's psychoanalytic experience. Every psychological revolution is a singular event. In concluding the exploration, I review the beneficial implications of the metaphor, specifically the integration of one- and two-person psychologies, systems theories, and other psychoanalytic perspectives.

A STRUCTURE FOR EXPLORING PSYCHOANALYTIC REVOLUTIONS

A few basic assumptions underlie the ensuing discussion. The idea that human subjectivity, presenting consciously and unconsciously in cognition, emotion, and behaviour, comprises the subject matter of psychoanalysis, is the first. The unconscious component of subjectivity has always been the hallmark of psychoanalysis, as are its three primary manifestations: repetition compulsion, transference, and dreams (or other signifiers of the unconscious). These categories create confusion because the last three are actually subsets of the first one. Nonetheless, they warrant separate naming because they were specifically isolated by Freud (1914/1991), elaborated upon by Lacan (1998) as four fundamental concepts, and also identified by Harari (2004). The dynamic unconscious, with its three primary manifestations, are universal human phenomena to which psychoanalysis uniquely attends. The unconscious exists regardless of how psychoanalytic scholars name, categorize, or theorize about it. It has been firmly established within and without psychoanalysis, including by contemporary academic, cognitive scientists (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Psychoanalysts may argue over how much drive, internal object relations, or early attachment relationships create the unconscious. However, they agree on its existence.

The second assumption surrounds clinical pluralism, namely using psychoanalytic meta-psychologies as perspectives, angles, analogies, or metaphors for symbolizing patterns of subjectivity. The psychophysiological, historical, cultural, sociological, and even economic forces creating subjectivity evade reduction into one universal meta-psychology – especially given these factors interact over time. Mills (2012), who doubts ‘one coherent comparative-integrative contemporary psychoanalytic paradigm’ (p. 22) will be possible, and Greenberg (2015), who fears a unified psychoanalytic metapsychology ‘will elude us forever’ (p. 30), agree. Clinical psychoanalysis’ destiny lies in pluralism. The case examples utilize metaphors from a variety of different psychoanalytic theorists, customized to the styles of each dyad.

Providing a structure for such pluralism, psychoanalytic psychotherapists utilize three basic professional behaviours – *framing*, *presence*, and *engagement* (Karbelnig, 2014, 2018a, 2018b). Clinicians *frame* their psychoanalytic interpersonal relationships by establishing and maintaining environments facilitative of psychoanalytic processes. They bring their *presence* to patients through empathy, attention, attunement, interest, respect, and curiosity. (Interpersonally or relationally oriented clinicians believe presence contributes to transformation.) Finally, psychoanalysts *engage* their patients in forms of dialogue, consciously and unconsciously, verbally and nonverbally, and in other, more mysterious ways, such as through ‘reverie’ (Bion, 1963, p. 19). Acknowledging Foucault’s (1970) humbling observations regarding the arbitrary nature of classification systems, these words – framing, presence, and engagement – show pragmatic promise. They encompass Freud’s (1993a) initial description of the psychoanalytic method. Other psychoanalysts use similar phrases. Laplanche (1999), for example, believes psychoanalysts serve three functions: ‘The analyst as the guarantor of constancy; the analyst as the director of the method and the companion of the primary process’ (p. 227). Framing guarantees the constancy; presence offers the companionship; engagement directs the method. Consistent with my earlier comparisons to psychoanalysis as performance art (Karbelnig, 2014), the three words are also terms-of-art in theatre: *Framing* means creating the transformational space (as in an auditorium); *presence* refers to actors and audiences bringing their attention to performances; *engagement* describes audience involvement (but, in psychoanalysis, describes both parties’ participation).

Third, and to avoid bitter controversies regarding session frequency or use of the couch, I use the term, psychoanalysis, to refer to facilitating psychodynamic or psychoanalytic processes, whether meeting patients once or five times a week, whether using the couch or not, and whether treating mental illnesses or helping patients navigate life stressors. I assume words like psychoanalyst, psychodynamic psychotherapist, psychoanalytic psychotherapist, or depth therapist mean the same thing.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND REVOLUTIONS

Beating the psychoanalysts to the punch, political scientists have already compared societal revolutions to psychodynamic ones. Marxist scholar Antonio

Gramsci, as cited in Forgacs (2000), directly cites the revolutionary effects of depth psychotherapy, writing, ‘The struggle against the juridical order is conducted through Freudian psychological analysis’ (p. 415). Similarly, Marcuse (1966) writes:

... repression from without has been supported by repression from within: the unfree individual introjects his masters and their commands into his own mental apparatus. The struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of man, as the self-repression of the repressed individual, and his self-repression in turn sustains his masters and their institutions. (p. 16)

Freeing individuals from internal persecution mimics freeing citizens from oppressive governments. Waters (1970), studying the mass strikes prior to the Russian revolution, considered local union upsurges as ‘the starting point of a feverish work of revolution [... resulting in a ...] violent sudden jerk which disturbs the momentary equilibrium of everyday social life’ (pp. 181 – 2). The latter phrase might as well describe what occurs in a powerful psychotherapy session. Along these same lines, Margaret Thatcher, cited in Junger (2016), quipped after her election to Prime Minister in 1979, ‘in every upheaval we rediscover humanity and regain freedom’ (p. 66). Competent depth psychotherapy disrupts similarly.

The Oxford English dictionary identifies the word ‘revolution’ as first appearing in the French language in the thirteenth century; it entered the English lexicon a century later. The term initially described the revolving motion of celestial bodies. British historians, calling the replacement of James II with William III in Britain the ‘glorious revolution’, were among the first to use *revolution* to describe abrupt societal changes. Four centuries later, Marx (2011) focused his scholarship on political revolutions. He believed humans translate the material world into forms of thought, extending Hegel’s (1977) idealism. In other words, socioeconomically based forces create intra-psycho and interpersonal conflicts leading to revolutions. For example, the proletariat – empowered by their awareness of the inequities inherent in class differences – were fated to overthrow the bourgeoisie in Russia. Marxism became the general model used to describe the twentieth century revolutions.

Revolutionary Marxism evolved significantly thereafter. A scholar of this political movement, Le Blanc (2016) traces its history through Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci. Stalinism and Maoism convinced scholars of the disasters inherent in the original Marxist vision of revolution. Post-Marxists like Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2000) believed history unfolds more through consciousness and will than socioeconomic forces. In other words, Mouffe and Laclau (1985) believe, the emotions of individual persons – like feelings of well-being, compassion for others, and tolerance of differences – motivate citizens to overturn governing bodies. Le Blanc (2016) agrees. He notes how, rather than class differences, issues like civil rights, war, race, gender, and the environment caused the disruptions of the 1960s. Le Blanc (2016) argues that

... such non-class ‘identities’ (and questions of culture rather than economics) should be our focal-point, that these ‘identities’ – which define the actuality of each human individual in our society as much as does class, and which often more decisively shape the consciousness of the individual (and the perceptions of others) – are generated by cultural factors that are relatively autonomous from economics. (p. 139)

Further highlighting parallels between societies and individuals, Marcuse (1964, 1966, 1969) believes psychoanalytic work to free individuals from internal oppression empowers them to address societal concerns. He writes, ‘The idea of “inner freedom” here has its reality: it designates the private space in which man may become and remain “himself”’ (Marcuse, 1964, p. 10). Further, Marcuse (1964) believes, social democracy requires a ‘radical change in consciousness ... the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the new Subject’ (p. 53). In confirmation, Lacan (1953, 1988, 1998) considers psychoanalysis the process of liberating the *subject*, namely the real, authentic person, from the *ego* created to please family, society, and other external influences.

Of the three major revolutions prior to the mid-twentieth century, French, American, and Russian, the American Revolution is considered most successful (Arendt, 2006). Not only less bloody, the American Revolution featured lingering compassion for citizens. Major authorities on the American Revolution, including Alden (1969), Atkinson (2019), Bailyn (2017), and Wood (2002), list the founding of the American colonies, the French and Indian war, religious conformism, and the imposition of various taxes as its major causes. These unfair conditions fit well with Mouffe and Laclau’s (1985), Marcuse’s (1964, 1966, 1969), and Le Blanc’s (2016) ideas about social factors eliciting revolutions: the colonists felt poorly treated; they anticipated their well-being would be enhanced by independence from Britain; and they sought tolerance of religious differences.

In a parallel manner, patients typically present with some type of emotional upheaval, even perhaps internally unfair conditions, akin to what Mouffe and Laclau (1985) describe. By definition, a critical disequilibrium requiring a third-party intervention has occurred. Indeed, many psychoanalytic patients are persons struggling with grievances-ready-for-revolution. According to the *Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions* (Goldstone, 1998), societal revolutions are characterized by two processes: (1) irregular procedures eliciting forced changes in societies; and (2) the resultant changes create lasting, positive effects. Psychoanalytic processes are clearly irregular procedures. They intend to foment personal transformations. McAllum (2018) considers revolutions to be ruptures in the fabric of history – a use of language mirroring how patients who achieve significant psychological changes might speak; that is, the fabrics of their histories have changed. Szasz (1968) writes:

The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is thus comparable to the aim of liberal political reform. The purpose of a democratic constitution is to give a people constrained by an oppressive government greater freedom in their economic, political, and religious conduct. The purpose of psychoanalysis is to give

patients constrained by their habitual patterns of action greater freedom in their personal conduct. (p. 18)

BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC REVOLUTIONS

Liberating patients from their self- or other-destructive internal dramas – operating in parallel in their interpersonal sphere – requires psychoanalysts to create environments of safety. Over time, they then dislodge patients' steadfast connection to the myriad actors in their internal worlds, which, in turn, alters their actual interpersonal relationships. Psychoanalytic scholars alluding to the foundational relationship needed to facilitate transformation include Alexander's (1950) 'corrective emotional experience' (p. 484), Winnicott's (1960) 'holding environment' (p. 591), Kohut's (1975) 'transmuting internalization' (p. 329), and Lindon's (1994) 'optimal provision' (p. 553). Fairbairn (1952) ultimately concluded that safety, taking form in the introjection of a good object, was crucial. The concept of *presence* (Karbelnig, 2018a, 2018b), an essential backdrop for psychoanalytic processes, allows psychoanalysts to carefully attend to, respect, hear, witness, and attune to patients. These ways of receiving patients, of metaphorically opening arms to their subjective experiences, could also (if dangerously) be called *love*. (Bowlby, the founder of attachment theory, considered using the word love instead of attachment but chose the latter because it sounded more scientific.) Interestingly, Barsness (2018) found clinicians self-identified as relational in orientation shared one, broad core category – love for their patients. And, even the more conservatively oriented psychoanalysts remain closely attuned to patients – even if they emphasize privilege over caring. The idea of love is difficult for those identifying a psychoanalysis as empirically based as, say, radiation oncology. However, what relationship with a professional – in accounting, law, medicine – is not enhanced by feeling a practitioner's care? Interestingly, love also proves central to societal revolutions. The Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara (2003) notes that:

the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love ... We must strive every day so that this love of living humanity will be transformed into actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a moving force. (p. 86)

Accessing and altering patients' internal dramas follows from the foundational safety, the sanctuary, of psychotherapists' consulting rooms. Any way psychoanalysts disrupt patients' internal and external dramas are analogues to revolution. Not all succeed, individually or societally.

THE CONTEXT OF BROADER SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The tertiary theme under consideration, namely how psychotherapists inciting changes in patients' internal worlds influences their interpersonal worlds, requires a brief journey into systems and family therapy literature. Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1969), credited with creating general systems theory (GST), identified

trends in the complexity of multi-systems. GST overlaps with holism. Approaching systems from a different angle, Smuts (1986), holism's originator, captured the dynamic connections between parts and wholes. Holism considers a complicated organizational entity, like human subjectivity, as irreducible to interacting parts like superegos frustrating id-drives. It believes no one part can be considered apart from the others. Koestler (1967) coined the word 'holon' (p. 45) to describe an entity existing simultaneously as a whole and a part. In performing their revolutionary work, psychoanalysts influence systems and holons well beyond their dyadic professional relationship.

Systems theories, which arrived fairly recently into psychoanalytic scholarship, have mostly focused on psychoanalyst–patient structures. Prior to joining the psychoanalytic opus, the concept of interpersonal systems became popularized in the family therapy literature, primarily through the work of Murray Bowen (1994) and Carl Whittaker (1982). Stolorow (1991) was among the first psychoanalysts to refer to systems models. Miller (1999) journeyed further, describing psychoanalysis as a 'messy business' in which 'every interaction is the product of a multitude of influences from the patient and the analyst and from the present and the past' (p. 377). More recently, Baranger and Baranger (2008) delved still deeper into the psychoanalytic field. Galatzer-Levy's (1995) dynamic systems model integrates concepts from quantum mechanics, relativity, and chaos theory into 'a different form of theorizing than has previously been used in psychoanalysis' (p. 1110). However, and again, few systems-oriented psychoanalysts attend to what happens in patients' actual interpersonal relationships – despite the power of these external affiliations. Freud (1993c) considered psychoanalysis an 'impossible profession', like 'education or government' (p. 248), precisely because social forces threaten forward progress in these fields.

INTRODUCTION TO CASE EXAMPLES

The two clinical cases illustrating psychodynamic revolutionary processes require identifying two additional assumptions – the universalities of resistance and of individuation. Beginning with the former, many factors, in addition to the powerful valence holding together patients' internal dramas, cause patients to resist change. Painful emotions – envy, loss, grief, rage, mourning, sadness – typically emerge as psychoanalytic processes unfold. Patients may relive traumatic memories; they may painfully re-experience long-repressed, unmet need states. Human beings are, naturally, averse to pain. Also, we fear non-conformity. The 'Big Other' (Zizek, 2006, p. 8) imposes pressures to obey 'society's unwritten constitution' (Zizek, 1992, p. 8) – yet another reason for fearing change. Interestingly, Lacan (1953) believes resistance primarily comes from clinicians themselves. Indeed, he primarily blames them: 'there is only one resistance, the resistance of the analyst' (Lacan, 1988, p. 228). Hirsch (2008) enumerates myriad fears psychoanalysts unconsciously harbour – usually presenting subtly in the countertransference – limiting clinicians. In

summary, resistance emerges from internal dramas, from external relationships, from society, and from psychoanalysts themselves.

The second assumption surrounds the universality of individuation. Jung's (1915, 1989) considered individuation a drive in itself, a motivation distinct from Freud's dual drive theory. Individuation plays a central role in both case examples; it also proves relevant in actual revolutions, which often involve separation from colonizing powers. Developmental theorists from Piaget to Erikson, and psychoanalysts from Freud to Mitchell, identify universal transitions from the symbiotic connection with caregivers into the capacity for contextualized interpersonal relationships. Fairbairn (1941) describes children as ideally evolving from infantile to 'mature dependence' (p. 256). Mahler (1963) thought 'the developmental process is characterized by the predominance of the child's pleasure in independent functioning' (p. 308). Winnicott (1975) believed children seek 'an atmosphere in which they can *start on their own lives*' (p. 93, original emphasis). Balint (1979) poetically writes of persons' evolution from the world of one (infancy) to the world of others (maturity). These schemes mirror common psychoanalytic developmental models like the transition from pre-oedipal to oedipal level or from paranoid-schizoid to depressive level functioning (Klein, 1946). In collectivist cultures, like China or India, young adults have a greater propensity to live in inter-generational family environments. However, and ideally, they mature into having intimate interpersonal relationships, a sense of their own desires, wishes, and plans – even if their parents live in the room next door. They learn to balance care for self with care for others and to consider themselves within the context of local, national, or even global societies.

In each case description, I describe patients' resistance to change and their movements towards individuation. Additionally, I identify specific encounters signalling potential, personal revolutions. The first patient, Aaron, faced extreme intra-psychoic and social forces preventing change. In retrospect, I made errors in boundary maintenance, failed to sufficiently confront him, and enabled self-destructive patterns – bringing to mind Lacan's (1953, 1988, 1998) and Hirsch's (2008) holding psychoanalysts primarily responsible for resistance. The analysis took place in the early 1990s, while I was in formal psychoanalytic training. Looking back, I wonder if greater proficiency would have helped. However I contributed to the negative outcome, Aaron's own resistance, and the support it found in family and friends, ultimately won out. By analogy, the French, the Dutch, the Native Americans, and other allies turned against the American rebellion rather than supported it. (Tragically, the newly founded country of the United States later committed genocide against the Native Americans, darkening the generally bright lens through which the American revolution is viewed historically.) The second case example, illustrating a successful revolution, shows specific interventions fomenting change, identifies unconscious transference and countertransference themes, and highlights how, in contrast to Aaron, the real interpersonal relationships in Beth's life helped positive change occur. Please note these two case examples were created from an amalgam of actual patients I have seen or supervised. Identifying information has been anonymized to protect patients' privacy and confidentiality.

A QUASHED REVOLUTION

Aaron, a tall, dark-haired, morbidly obese young man, sought depth psychotherapy to reduce feelings of depression, to free himself from being 'overly controlled' by his parents, and to improve academic performance. He spent most of his time playing video games and watching television. His parents consented to pay for a course of four-times-a-week psychoanalysis – on the condition they meet with me. I met with Aaron four times a week for four years. During the one meeting with his parents, Aaron slouched sideways on the couch, appearing diminished. He was an only child. His mother, a biologist in a university research laboratory, dominated the family. When addressing Aaron's lack of work experience, his mother worried even a part-time job would 'take away his focus'. She gave him \$100 per week and access to the family credit card. Aaron's father, a physician specializing in nephrology, deferred to his wife on all parenting matters.

A few months into our psychotherapy sessions, Aaron discussed an ambition for training as a social worker. Until then, he had struggled to find much of a sense of any desire or wishes, let alone a career goal. His parents rented him an apartment near the community college he attended after high school. They lived an hour away. Aaron and I explored, at length, the apparent unconscious contract, within Aaron as well as within the family system, to maintain his Peter Pan status. A few months after moving into the apartment – his first experience living away from home – Aaron invited his high-school girlfriend, Susan, to live with him. She became pregnant shortly thereafter. Aaron's parents 'rushed' him and Susan into marriage. Neither Aaron nor Susan had ever worked – not even in part-time positions. Distracted by his wife's pregnancy, Aaron dropped his college courses. His parents encouraged him and Susan to focus on rearing the infant, Elizabeth. I repeatedly confronted Aaron on his propensity to accept these invitations for regression. He showed little defensiveness initially, agreeing with my observations. He planned to resume his classes in a year, emphasizing his wish to 'be freed from my parents' control'.

An intelligent young man, Aaron quickly gained an astute understanding of his exceedingly enmeshed family. We spent much of the first year of analysis identifying 'thriving' versus 'regressing' themes. Although I felt drawn to rescue Aaron in a maternal way, another level of countertransference consisted of an angry, paternal-like feeling. I felt irritated at Aaron's infantile lifestyle. I kept these reactions in check, fearing I would assume too much of his own nascent motivation. Over time, I became increasingly confrontive of Aaron's propensities towards passivity and regression. When confronted, Aaron tended to feel criticized. I utilized Kleinian ideas about persecution (Klein, 1946) to help him understand his perception of me as 'attacking'. When I assumed a more maternal, receptive position, Aaron expressed concern that I was then 'coddling' him. A vacillating transference and countertransference pattern developed, roughly surrounding my alternatively behaving paternally and maternally. In retrospect, the maternal transference dominated. It may have elicited some rebellion, possibly facilitating unconscious regression.

It mirrored the way both parents treated him. Such a reaction, if true, represents unexpressed and undealt with negative transference.

The birth of Elizabeth during the second year of the analysis seemed a harbinger for Aaron's growth. It sparked a 'need to grow up'. Meanwhile, while his parents set up a nursery in Aaron and Susan's apartment, they also created an elaborate one in their own home. They 'insisted' Elizabeth spend weekends with them, 'to make it easier for you two'. The paternal-side of my countertransference sharply increased. I became highly confrontive. Aaron protested, accusing me of 'pushing too hard'. I wondered if my anger might have a projective identification component to it. Was I feeling *his* anger at his parents? Our discussions remained generally focused on Aaron's lack of direction, absence of independent income, and dependency on his parents.

Three significant, positive changes occurred in the third year of the analysis. Aaron returned as a full-time student. His parents withdrew financial support for the psychoanalysis (likely threatened by the individuation occurring). Aaron obtained a student loan to pay for our sessions. However, the loan relied upon fraudulent expenses, e.g. the already-paid tuition and housing receipts he submitted as justifying the loan. Nonetheless, even such indirect action represented motivation on Aaron's part. He kept his continuing work with me secret from his parents. We discussed the unconscious conspiracy about deceiving them, and the dissociation from his conscience it involved. Also, Aaron finally obtained a half-time position working as a barista in a coffee shop. He once assured me, 'I could not have come this far without you'. Unfortunately, these progressive moves were overshadowed by subsequent regressive forces.

Several events occurred in the last two years of our work together that, in retrospect, predicted the failure of Aaron's personal revolution. The work at the coffee house was 'too stressful'. He resigned after six months. Soon thereafter, Aaron also quit his classes. Aaron's neither earning income nor college credits dominated our discussions. As he regressed, our relationship became more conflictual. As before, Aaron protested the confrontations but feared any significant support could reinforce his backwards movement. These sessions featured the last gasps of potentially revolutionary movement in Aaron's life. During this regressive period, I again asked Aaron about his future. Did he still envision attending graduate school in social work, and then obtaining independent licensure or work in the field? Aaron haltingly reported how such images had vanished. Instead, he described the following scene: His parents would develop an illness requiring him to return home. He would live there until the other parent's death. Eventually, he anticipated, he, Susan, and Elizabeth would relocate there. The apocryphal image proved, ultimately, the strongest motive. No 'revolutionary event' (McAlum, 2018, p. 3) was to occur. The few feeble efforts at individuation – the part-time job, the return to college, and even the secret loan – were short-lived. In confirmation, and as our fourth year of work began, Aaron began running 5, 10, even 15 minutes late for sessions. I interpreted these behaviours as passive-aggressive. Hints of a breaking point in our relationship emerged when I set limits on Aaron's tardiness. When Aaron continued to run late,

I set these limits: if he were more than 10 minutes late, I charged him for the session but not see him. He reacted angrily, accusing me of controlling him.

As a present for his 21st birthday, Aaron's parents added a bathroom and a private entrance to their home. Lacking any reason to remain in their collegiate apartment, the young family moved into the parental home. Several months later, facing a one-hour commute to sessions, Aaron terminated the psychoanalysis. I struggled mightily to contain what had morphed into an almost furious negative countertransference. I felt beaten. However, I had allied myself as best I could with Aaron's individuation forces. The regressive ones in him, and in those around him, ultimately trumped his nascent desire for independence. The final year of the analysis mirrored what would have occurred if the French, Dutch, and Native Americans assisted Britain in crushing the American independence-seeking colony. Psychologically speaking, Aaron remained colonized.

A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION

Beth first appeared for our sessions dressed casually, seemingly distancing herself from her recent status as a Director of Human Resources for a Fortune 500 company. When the firm reorganized, she accepted a generous severance package that included a year's salary. She wanted a change. Beth sought psychotherapy during this period for several reasons. Her life choices, she believed, were excessively influenced by others. Decisions ranging from their residence, the size of their house, to child-rearing practices, emanated from her husband's desires, not hers. Also, she felt 'led around' by a mentor at work. Further she wondered if another career would suit her better. We met twice a week for a total of five years.

Several features of Beth's early childhood explain her lack of agency. She was reared in an economically depressed, rural community. Her father worked as a classroom teacher; her mother as a homemaker. When Beth turned 10, her father developed debilitating anxiety attacks. They prevented him from teaching. At his request, he worked as a janitor at the same school. Beth's mother, feeling 'crushed' by her husband's problem and the related economic loss, began abusing alcohol. Beth said, 'My childhood ended then'. She and her two siblings 'floated around' with little structure, boundaries, or limits. Although superior intellectually, Beth never took her own education seriously. A high-school guidance counsellor recommended she attend a vocational school, suggesting she train as a child care assistant or a clerk-typist. Beth decided, instead, to immediately find work upon graduation. She waited tables at restaurants for the next two years. Several fellow waitresses attended college, motivating Beth to enrol in college courses. Her excellent academic performance surprised her. She transferred to a four-year university, obtained a degree in political science, and sought work suitable to her educational level.

When she graduated university, Beth moved into her own apartment. She began dating and, fairly quickly, married a man, Gary. He had a son from a previous marriage. Sensing she had 'people skills', Beth quit waitressing and obtained a position in the human resources department of a forestry service office. She functioned well.

Her supervisor, Bob, assumed a role of mentor for further career development. He later transferred to a human resources job at a major news network. He encouraged Beth to move with him. Subsequently, he moved to Disney, and later to a major accounting firm. Beth also followed Bob to both these firms. When she entered psychoanalytic psychotherapy, she and Bob, both between jobs, were meeting monthly for lunch to review future job options.

The theme of self-undervaluation emerged as most prominent in our initial sessions. When reflecting on her attributes – that is, intelligence or attractiveness – Beth denigrated herself. She was prone to ‘follow’ others, evidenced in her passively following the desires of Gary and Bob. Six months into our work together, Bob was offered a job as vice president of HR for a national real estate brokerage. Repeating the familiar pattern, he offered her a job there. Beth agreed, ultimately working for the company for two years. Then, because her self-image had solidified and her self-confidence increased, she resisted the next opportunity to switch jobs with him. Bob felt surprised. By then, Beth had identified an interest in the rapidly expanding video gaming industry. She sought, and obtained, a position as an HR director in a multi-national firm, *Riot Productions*. Meanwhile, our discussions as to whether or not work as an HR professional suited her fell to the wayside.

In the early months of our work, I listened carefully to, and mirrored back, the themes Beth found the most problematic, namely the passivity in her relationships and her lack of a clear sense of occupational purpose. Ironically, Beth behaved assertively when cloaked in an occupational role. In her intimate relationships, however, she fell into a people-pleasing style. She experienced anger, sadness, and a sense of ‘feeling lost’ as we explored these themes. As our work progressed, I became more confrontational. The confrontations were, generally, followed by interpretations incorporating Lacan’s (1953, 1991, 1998) ideas on the centrality of desire, Erikson’s (1994) on self-doubt versus autonomy, and Jung’s (1989) concept of individuation. During the middle phase, Beth progressed quickly.

As we entered the fourth year of our work together, Beth displayed a still greater appreciation of her personhood. Along the way, she became angry at her husband, her mentor, and me. She accused Gary of leading her through life. His initial reluctance to ‘own his part’ infuriated Beth. Within a few months, however, she realized the problem lay more with her passivity than his dominance. Gary came to understand the subtle dominance-submission pattern. He cooperated in transitioning the relationship into a more balanced, intersubjective one. Meanwhile, Beth expressed her desires more overtly. She developed two new female friendships that morphed into couple friends for her and Gary. She took up tennis and hiking. Regarding her relationship with her mentor, Bob, she was irritated by what she believed were his poor employment decisions. Here, and different from her struggles with Gary, Beth came to view the problem as Bob’s rather than hers. Bob, she believed, was devoted to keeping Beth in the submissive, student role. Beth’s anger at me emerged from my confrontations over her obsequiousness. She *always* arrived early for sessions. She *always* listened attentively.

In retrospect, I wonder if she may have unconsciously experienced me as controlling, like Bob. It may have represented unexpressed and undealt with negative transference. Almost certainly multi-determined, Beth's anger at me likely erupted because she felt safe. Working through her fury represented the most revolutionary moments in our work together. I could almost feel the loosening of the players in her internal drama; that is, the submissive ego accustomed to submitting to a dominant internal other. In parallel, her external relationships shifted. Beth became less compliant. Her capacity for assertion, in her personal relationships, increased dramatically. Her growth manifested in her relationship with me. She disagreed with several subsequent interpretations. For example, I suggested her passivity had evolved in reaction to what seemed like an emotional orphan-hood. Raising her voice, Beth replied, 'You're wrong about that'. This impression morphed, through our mutual discussions, into more of an understanding of her having felt parental love, at least early on. Once she entered latency age, her parents became preoccupied with their own problems. She felt not so much orphaned as initially loved and, then, abruptly, 'dropped'. I repeatedly asked if she might also be perceiving me as mentor-like. She thought not but, again, it remains possible that it unconsciously contributed to the negative transference.

Regarding my countertransference, I felt less anger at Beth than I had with Aaron. I felt frustrated *on behalf* of Beth. Sufficiently influenced by the intersubjective and relational schools, I looked inward to see to what extent I might have been projecting onto Beth, wanting her to be less agreeable. One never knows for certain about unconscious processes, but I observed no evidence of a wish to influence Beth. Also differing from my experience with Aaron, my countertransference turned, and remained, mostly positive as she matured further. Working through decades of repressed anger occupied much of the final phase of our work. Beth became still more assertive. There was further improvement in her capacity to communicate needs and feelings. Her anger at me lessened. Then, it transitioned into exploring the meaning of our work together. She wondered if she had become too dependent, if our meetings represented a 'crutch' for her. Further discussion, by both of us, revealed no such dependency.

Instead, I suggested, her inquiries about our work represented individuation and, perhaps, the beginning of the termination process. We concluded, together, that our work had focused on identifying and expressing her desires, increasing her self- as opposed to other-valuation, and deepening her capacity for intimacy. Borrowing Kohut's (1975, 1979) terminology, Beth developed a more cohesive self. Her self-object functioned better. I again raised the issue of her career choice, and Beth replied that, at that point, she felt satisfied remaining in the HR field. In the final analysis, many positive transformations occurred in Beth, intra- and extra-psychically. Her husband's encouragement, even active participation, promoted her capacity for greater reciprocity, negotiation, and dialogue. He reinforced her positive self-image, supported the changes she made occupationally, and appreciated her broader social network. Beth eventually broke off the contact with Bob. The gaming company's CEO showered Beth with praise, elevating her sense of competence.

These external, real-life relationships enhanced Beth's identity as individuated person. Consonant with the theme of this investigation, the revolution succeeded because of external as well as intra-psychic factors. This time, the French, Dutch, and Native Americans *did* rescue the Americans, contributing to the creation of a sovereign nation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The idea that psychoanalysts foment personal revolutions in their patients' lives encompasses extant psychoanalytic meta-psychologies, particularly the interpersonal, intersubjective, and general systems theories. The irregular procedures identified by Goldstone (1998), referring to mutative social processes, mirrors how psychoanalytic relationships alter individuals. And, similar to the societal ones sought by revolutionaries, psychoanalytic practitioners or partisans hope their patients make lasting, positive personal transformations. Further, comparing psychoanalytic processes to societal revolutions broadens explanations of psychoanalytic change.

Like revolutionaries fighting rigid social systems, we psychoanalytic psychotherapists fight rigidity in patients' internal worlds and in their interpersonal contexts. The intra-psychic changes we incite in patients shake up their external ones, the external affects the internal, and so on *ad infinitum*. Indeed, psychoanalysts' work includes throwing symbolic Molotov cocktails into patients' internal dramas, which, because of their intra-psychic rigidity mirrored by equally inflexible interpersonal patterns, require aggressive agitation for change to occur. Echoing these sentiments, Szasz (1968) called for '... a morally grounded psychoanalysis, relevant to law, politics, and social science; rather than a biologically grounded psychoanalysis, relevant to medicine, public health, and therapeutics' (p. 257n).

In the case of Aaron, the psychoanalytic revolution failed because of the intransigence of his internal drama *combined* with powerful interpersonal forces, namely his parents' resistance to his budding individuality. The therapeutic alliance was overcome by characterological and interpersonal resistance. My relative inexperience, combined with generally too maternal of a countertransference, made matters worse. The remarkably positive changes Beth enjoyed resulted from confrontations, interpretations, and the interpersonal holding our professional relationship afforded her. The intra-psychic alterations which followed, as well as the support she received from actual interpersonal relationships, moved her into greater self-cohesion and individuation. New friendships, support from work-friends, and increased intimacy in her social and marital relationships helped ensure positive change. Also helpful was her distancing herself from with her domineering mentor, Bob.

The analogy to societal revolutions emphasizes the intimacy required of the psychoanalytic dyad to foment change. The intensity of psychoanalytic encounters requires an almost revolutionary fervour – captured by Fairbairn's (1952) quip, 'perhaps the psychoanalyst is really rather lucky to get away with a whole skin when he invites human beings to inspect their own motives' (p. 249). The

psychoanalyst–patient bond must be intense enough to dislodge the familiar, habitual, addictive-like nature of patients' internal dramas. These private, personal revolutions require an establishment of trust, of a therapeutic alliance, even love. The intense psychotherapist–patient partnership facilitates clinicians work to disturb, disrupt, unsettle, agitate, or otherwise tamper with the types of well worn patterns Freud (1993b) initially identified as the repetition compulsion. Adam Phillips, as reported in an interview described by Choder-Goldman (2014), said:

I think if people don't care about each other, nothing's going to happen, and if people aren't moved by each other, nothing is going to happen. (p. 342)

It is, indeed, the fervour of the professional interpersonal relationship, whether constrained by traditionally conservative values or unbridled by the more relational ones, that, in the end, foments revolutionary transformations in our patients.

REFERENCES

- Alden, J.R. (1969) *A History of the American Revolution*. New York: Knopf.
- Alexander, F. (1950) Analysis of the therapeutic factors in psychoanalytic treatment. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* **19**: 482–500. <https://doi.org/10.1002/fj.2167-4086.2007.tb00293.x>
- Arendt, H. (2006) *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin.
- Aron, L. (1991) The patient's experience of the analyst's subjectivity. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* **1**(1): 29–51.
- Atkinson, R. (2019) *The British are Coming: The War for America*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Bailyn, B. (2017) *The Ideology of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Original work published 1967.)
- Balint, M (1979) *The Basic Fault*. London and New York: Tavistock Publications.
- Baranger, M. & Baranger, W. (2008) The analytic situation as a dynamic field. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* **89**: 795–826.
- Barness, R.E. (ed.) (2018) *Core Competencies in Relational Psychoanalysis: A Guide to Practice, Study, and Research*. London: Routledge.
- Bion, W.R. (1963) *Elements of Psycho-analysis*. London: Heinemann.
- Boston Change Process Study Group (2010) *Changes in Psychotherapy: A Unifying Paradigm*. New York: Norton.
- Bowen, M. (1994) *Family Therapy in Clinical Practice*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Choder-Goldman, J. (2014) An interview with Adam Phillips. *Psychoanalytic Perspectives* **11**(3): 334–47.
- Erikson, E. (1994) *Identity and the Life Cycle*. New York: Norton.
- Fairbairn, W.R. (1941). A revised psychopathology of the psychoses and psychoneuroses. *International Journal Psychoanalysis* **22**: 250–79.
- Fairbairn, W.R.D. (1952) *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality*. London: Tavistock.
- Forgacs, D. (ed.) (2000) *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916–1935*. New York: NYU Press.
- Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (trans. Sheridan, A.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1995) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (trans. Sheridan, A.). New York: Vintage Books.

- Freud, S. (1991) Remembering, repeating, and working-through. *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, volume XII (1911-13), pp. 143–156. Original work published in 1914.
- Freud, S. (1993a) Recommendations to physicians practicing psycho-analysis. *SE 12*, pp. 109–20. (Original work published 1912.)
- Freud, S. (1993b) Remembering, repeating, and working-through. *SE 12*, pp. 143–56. (Original work published 1914.)
- Freud, S. (1993c) Analysis terminable and interminable. *SE 23*, pp. 209–54. (Original work published in 1937.)
- Fromm, E. (1961). *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Fromm, E. (2000) Dealing with the unconscious in psychotherapeutic practice. *International Forum Psychoanalysis 9*(3–4): 167–86.
- Galatzer-Levy, R.M. (1995) Psychoanalysis and dynamical systems theory: Prediction and self similarity. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 43*: 1085–113.
- Ghent, E. (1989) Credo – *The Dialectics of One-Person and Two-Person Psychologies*. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis 25*: 169–211.
- Goldstone, J.A. (1998) (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions*. New York: Routledge.
- Greenberg, J.R. (2015) Therapeutic action and the analyst's responsibility. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 63*: 15–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003065114561861>.
- Guevara, C. (2003) *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution*. New York: Ocean Press. (Original work published 1965.)
- Harari, R. (2004) *Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction*. New York: Other Press.
- Hartmann, H. (1952) The mutual influences in the development of ego and Id. *Psychoanalytic Study Child 7*: 9–30.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) *Phenomenology of Spirit* (trans. Miller, A.V.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1807.)
- Hirsch, I. (2008) *Coasting in the Countertransference*. New York: The Analytic Press.
- Jung, C.G. (1915). The theory of psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Review 2*: 29–51.
- Jung, C.G. (1989) *Memories, Dreams, and Reflections* (trans. Winston, R. & Winston, C.). Vintage: New York.
- Junger, S. (2016) *Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging*. New York: Hachette Book Group.
- Karbelnig, A.M. (2014) The sanctuary of empathy and the invitation of engagement: Psychic retreat, Kafka's 'A Hunger Artist,' and the psychoanalytic process. *The Psychoanalytic Review 101*(6): 895–924.
- Karbelnig, A.M. (2018a) A perilous high wire act: framing psychoanalytic relationships with severely traumatized patients. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 87*(3): 443–78.
- Karbelnig, A.M. (2018b) Addressing psychoanalysis's post-tower of babel linguistic challenge: A proposal for a cross-theoretical, clinical nomenclature. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis 103*(1): 69–109.
- Klein, M. (1946) Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis 27*: 99–110.
- Klein, M. (1950) On the criteria for the termination of a psycho-analysis. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 31*: 78–80.
- Koestler, A. (1967) *The Ghost in the Machine*. New York: Penguin. (Original work published 1967.)

- Kohut, H. (1975) The future of psychoanalysis. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* **3**: 325–40.
- Kohut, H. (1979) The two analyses of Mr Z. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* **60**: 3–27.
- Lacan, J. (1953) Some reflections on the ego. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* **34**: 11–17.
- Lacan, J. (1988) *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954–1955* (trans. Tomaselli, S.). New York: Norton.
- Lacan, J. (1991) *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis 1969–1970* (trans. Grigg, R.). New York: Norton.
- Lacan, J. (1998) In: Miller, J. (ed.), *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (trans. Sheridan, A.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1973.)
- Laclau, E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999) *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Laplanche, J. (1999) *Essays on Otherness*. London: Routledge.
- Le Blanc, P. (2016) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Lindon, J.A. (1994) Gratification and provision in psychoanalysis: Should we get rid of 'The rule of abstinence?' *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* **4**: 549–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10481889409539038>.
- Mahler, M.S. (1963) Thoughts about development and individuation. *Psychoanalytic Study Child* **18**: 307–24.
- Marcuse, H. (1964) *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1966) *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1969) *An Essay on Liberation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marx, K. (2011) *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy* (trans. Moore, R.). New York: Create Space Independent Publishing. (Original work published 1867.)
- McAllum, M. (2018) All revolutions are equal; but some are more equal than others. *Journal of Future Studies* **23**(2): 1–12. [https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.201812_23\(2\).0001](https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.201812_23(2).0001)
- Meltzer, D. (1981) The Kleinian expansion of Freud's metapsychology. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* **62**: 177–85.
- Miller, M.L. (1999) Chaos, complexity, and psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Psychology* **16**(3): 355–79.
- Mills, J. (2012) *Conundrums: A Critique of Contemporary Psychoanalysis*. New York: Routledge.
- Mouffe, C. (2000) *The Democratic Paradox*. New York: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. & Laclau, E. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Ringstrom, P. (2007) Scenes that write themselves: Improvisational moments in relational psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* **17**: 69–99.
- Smuts, J.C. (1986) *Holism and Evolution*. Gouldsboro, ME: Gestalt Journal Press. (Original work published 1926.)
- Spillius, E.B. (1994) Developments in Kleinian thought: Overview and personal view. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* **14**(3): 324–64.

- Stolorow, R.D. (1991) The intersubjective context of intrapsychic experience: A decade of psychoanalytic inquiry. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* **11**(1/2): 171–84.
- Stolorow, R.D. & Atwood, G.E. (1996) The intersubjective perspective. *Psychoanalytic Review*, **83**(2): 181–94.
- Szasz, T.S. (1968) Psychoanalysis and the rule of law. *Psychoanalytic Review* **55**(2): 248–58.
- Szasz, T. (1988) *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- von Bertalanffy, K.L. (1969) *General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Application*. New York: Braziller Press.
- Waters, M-A (ed.) (1970) *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Whittaker, C. (1982) *From Psyche to System: The Evolving Therapy of Carl Whittaker* (eds Neil, J.R. & Kniskern, J.P.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Winnicott, D. (1960) The theory of the parent-infant relationship. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* **41**: 585–95.
- Winnicott, D. (1975) Through Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis. *The International Psychoanalytic Library*. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
- Wood, G. (2002) *The American Revolution*. New York: Random House.
- Zizek, S. (1992) *Enjoy Your Symptom!*. New York: Routledge.
- Zizek, S. (2006) *How to Read Lacan*. New York: Norton.

ALAN MICHAEL KARBELNIG PhD, ABPP practices psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and couples therapy in Pasadena, California. He earned two PhDs, one from the University of Southern California in 1986, and a second following his psychoanalytic training at the New Center for Psychoanalysis (NCP) in 1996. Shortly thereafter, he was certified in psychoanalysis by the American Psychoanalytic Association which later bestowed upon him the status of a supervising and training psychoanalyst. He is also board certified in forensic psychology by the American Board of Professional Psychology. He founded, serves on the board of directors of, and teaches at Rose City Center – a not-for-profit psychoanalytic psychotherapy clinic serving the economically disadvantaged in the Los Angeles area. An award-winning teacher, he lectures locally, nationally and internationally, including in Beijing, where he taught ‘British object relations theory’ and in Delhi and Ahmedabad, where he lectured on ‘The lover, the exorcist, and the critic: Understanding depth psychotherapists’ work’. Address for correspondence: [amkarbelnig@gmail.com]